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The racially based South African state has always served to
buttress severe forms of labour exploitation. It has been,
historically and in contemporary struggles, a cardinal force
shaping the form, character and goals of the progressive,
non-racial, trade union movement. This is not to imply that
the state was, and is, a determining force in this
regard. Such theorization would deemphasize the dimension of
leadership and the potential choices that emerge within tactical
and strategic debates. Our own approach in attempting to assess
the direction and potential of contemporary trade
unionism in South Africa, would be to assert the critical
importance of these tactical and strategic debates.
We would argue that fundamental differences in the
perceptions of the trade union role exist, differences that
have divided the trade union movement since unions first
emerged in nineteenth-century Europe. The division lies
between those who discern significant potential in trade
union activity, and those who argue that such activity does
not in itself facilitate (indeed some hold that it may even
inhibit) the transformation of capitalist society. Hyman
refers to the former as the optimistic tradition and the
latter as the pessimistic tradition. (1) These differences
need to be thoroughly debated, for they do have consequences
for the choices trade unions make in the face of the
unfolding of the state's reform strategy.
Our central argument holds that two approaches exist in the
non-racial trade union movement at present: orthodox, or
collective bargaining unionism, and political, or, social
movement unionism. By orthodox unionism, we mean a form of
trade unionism which concentrates almost exclusively on
workplace issues; fails to link production issues to wider
political issues; and finally encourages its members to
become politically involved without necessarily engaging
itself in the wider political arena, believing that this is
best left to other organizations more suited to the task.
The political content of such unionism varies widely, but
in each instance what is common to this orientation 1s an
accommodation and absorption into industrial relations
systems, which not only Institutionalize conflict, but also
serves to reinforce the division between economic and
political forms of struggle so essential to the maintenance
of capitalist relations, in production, in the community
and in the state.
The alternate tendency - political, or social movement
unionism - attempts to link production to wider
political issues. It is a form of union organization that
facilitates an active engagement 1n factory-based,
production politics, ajrt in community and state power
Issues. It engages In alliances in order to establish
relationships with political organizations on a systematic
basis. We would contrast this form of trade unionism with
what we call populist unionism in which trade unionism and
struggles in the factory are downplayed. The latter is a
tendency that neglects struggles over wages, supervision,
managerial controls at the workplace and job evaluation;
and places in its stead a political engagement that only
serves to dissipate tough struggle in these areas. This is
not political unionism at all, for political unionism attempts
to link the above struggles with community and state power
issues. Unlike syndicalism, our definition of political
unionism does not negate the role of a political party, but
rather asserts the need for a coordinating political body
that is democratic in its practices and therefore able to
relate to political unionism in a non-instrumental manner.
Political unionism emerged within SACTU in the 1950s,
indicating an orientation that held real promise not only
for challenging the apartheid state, but also for generating
a worker consciousness. It was formed in 1955 as a
predominantly African trade union federation drawing on the
defunct CNETU - a federation which had concentrated
exclusively on collective bargaining - but included amongst
its affiliates the "left1 non-racial strand of the
registered trade union movement formerly organised in the
Trades and Labour Council. SACTU's alliance with the ANC and
the Congress movement resulted in a novel redefinition of its
trade union role along the lines of "political unionism1.
Faced by a weak power base in the factories, a hostile state
and intransigent employers, SACTU chose to engage
politically with nationalism as a means of transforming
its small factory base.
Extensive research into SACTU's development during the late
'50s reveals that it grew most rapidly in those regions
where political unionism was consciously pursued.(2)
Political unionism coexisted with orthodox unionism within
SACTU, despite the general commitment of the federation to
political struggle through the alliance. Some have argued
that this engagement in the alliance led to the subordination
of the trade unions and working class demands to nationalism,
or populism. We would argue to the contrary: engagement in
the alliance facilitated the rapid development of trade union
organization, where attention was paid to the importance of
factory structures and production politics. This is not to
deny that in certain unions and in certain regions populist
unionism existed. However, the most systematic organizing
work within SACTU was along the lines of social movement,
or political unionism.
The 1950s1 experiment in political unionism hardly had
time to consolidate before it was preempted by the state
repression of the mid 1960s. South Africa was to
experience a decade of industrial peace. However , it
was a decade in which the economy experienced a structural
transformation financed by a massive influx of foreign
capital, accelerated expansion of industry, a restructuring
of capital and the growing concentration and centralisation of
ownership. The extent of cartelisation by the late 1970s may be
gauged by the information supplied by the Mouton Commission on
monoplies in 1977. According to the commission a mere 5% of the
total number of firms in the manufacturing sector between them
accounted for 63% of the sector's turnover; only 5% of those in
wholesale accounted for 69% of turnover; 5% of those in
construction accounted for 63% of turnover; and 5% in transport
for 73% of turnover.(3)
Coupled with these changes went a corresponding growth in the
black working class which brought black workers firmly to the
centre of the industrial stage . In particular, we see the growth
in the number of semi-skilled black workers, the organisational
base for industrial unionism. As Hemson writes,
° With the growth of monopoly capitalism and the
concentration of production in large-scale, highly
mechanised factories, went a black proletariat neither
differentiated by traditional skills, nor having
experienced the benefits of reform. These are the
conditions for a rapid advance in class
consciousness as the political resistance to
apartheid gains momentum '.(4)
By concentrating large numbers of workers in production,
the material conditions for a strengthened shop-floor-based trade
unionism had been created by the early 1970s. It was the mass
strikes in January and February 1973 in Durban that were to
dramatically highlight these changes: an estimated 100,000
workers broke the decade of 'industrial peace1 and took to the
streets to demand wage increases.
Managerial consultants and state strategists were
forced to place "the worker", on the agenda as militancy
destroyed comforting myths and exposed the weaknesses of the 50-
year-old dualistic system of industrial relations that conceded
certain rights to non-Africans, while at the same time excluding
African workers. The exclusion from these rights under the 1924
Industrial Conciliation Act, was reinforced by a unilateral
system of control over black workers that rested on the despotic
power of the supervisor.
This despotic regime inside the factory was backed up by
a tight system of control exercised by the state through Influx
control over black workers outside the firm. This dualistic
system of control entrenched a dualism 1n the labour market -
between a predominantly skilled and privileged white labour
aristocracy, and a non-unionised and vulnerable black and
unskilled labour force.
This system was to trigger off a crisis of control in the
1970s. The crisis was a result of a multiplicity of forces,
both economic and political, that led to challenges on the
shop floor to the managerially controlled liaison system.
The shop-floor-based unions that emerged in the early 1970s
eschewed political action outside of production. They
believed that it was Important to avoid the path taken by
SACTU in the 1950s. They argued that its close
identification with the Congress Alliance and its campaigns
was the cause of its demise in the 1960s. The emerging
unions chose to devote their attention to building democratic
shopfloor structures around the principle of worker control,
accountability and mandating of worker representatives, as a
basis for developing a working class leadership in the factories.
This strategy was justified in two ways. First, strong shopfloor
organisation had a better chance of surviving state repression
which would be directed in the first instance at °leaders'.
Second, they argued that at least until 1980-81, Its
political impact would have been insignifiant, whilst at the
same time, these fledgling unions had everything to lose by
adopting a confrontationist stance.
These challenges were to culminate in the establishment of
the Wiehahn Commission to investigate industrial
relations in 1977. Arising out of this investigation, the
Industrial Conciliation Act was amended to allow for
the recognition of black unions for the first time
in South African labour history. It would be better,
Wiehahn concluded, to allow African trade unions to register
at an early stage in order to control the pace of union
development.
The Wiehahn solution was clearly contradictory. The
intention was to control the emerging unions by drawing them
into the established industrial relations structures, in
particular the Industrial Councils, thus pre-empting these
unions' attempts to establish a shop floor presence and to
widen the scope of their activities into "non industrial
relations" arenas. This required giving unregistered
unions state recognition, enabling them to win space in their
attempt to move beyond the struggle for recognition to direct
negotiation at shop floor level. Recognition at plant level
was not won without struggle, but in the years immediately
after Wiehahn, a new frontier of control was being defined
as recognition agreements at plant level became increasingly
common in different sectors of the economy. :
In the immediate post-Wiehahn period, South Africa's
industrial relations practioners embarked on the difficult
task of attempting to integrate black workers' demands Into
the new collective bargaining system. Their aim was to
institutionalise industrial conflict along classical
pluralist lines. The oft-stated intention was the
patterning of union development along West European lines, where
unions confine themselves to workplace issues only. Political
engagement is left to political parties, which individual unions
may attempt to influence. State strategists saw the concession
of collective bargaining rights as the first step 1n a gradual
reform process that would culminate in certain, yet-to-be
determined, political rights for blacks. The unacceptable
alternative for the apartheid state was a radical
polIticization of labour with an overtly political trade
union movement engaged with the national liberation
movement.
It is now seven years since the state introduced
these reforms - enough time for a tentative evaluation as
to just how successful the strategists have been in attaining
their goals. Nearly two million workers - black and white -
now belong to trade unions affiliated to two major federations
- CUSA-AZACTU and COSATU. How effective has the state been in
patterning union development along 'pure' collective bargaining
lines? To what extent have the new unions been absorbed into
the industrial relations system in a way that institutionalizes
the separation between economic and wider political struggle?
The paper is divided into three parts. Part 1 deals with
the gains made In collective bargaining in the post-
Wiehahn period. Part 2 traces the re-emergence of
alliance politics in the trade union movement. Part 3
examines some of the obstacles to this alliance.
In this paper we concentrate on developments in COSATU and
one of its predecessors, FOSATU.
PART 1 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING UNIONISM
In our view, the results of the reform strategy are
contradictory. On the one hand, it would appear that
significant gains are being made in the immediate post-Wiehahn
period in developing a system of collective bargaining along
traditional industrial relations lines. They can be
summarised as follows :
1) An estimated 20% of the labour force now belong to
trade unions. A major contributing factor to this growth
has been the dramatic growth of the National Union of
Mineworkers. The foundations for national-based
industrial trade unions have now been laid in all major
sectors of the economy.
2). Perhaps more significant was the organisational depth of
these emerging unions. By the end of 1985, these unions
were organised 1n 3 500 workplaces, had signed 450 plant
agreements, had an estimated 1 500 shop steward
committees/councils and over 12 500 shop stewards.
3) Management's unilateral power to dismiss has
been curtailed by the emergence of a system of industrial
legality in the workplace, laying down a set of procedures
to be followed in the event of dismissal or retrenchment.
These procedures have been strengthened by the dramatic
increase in the use of the Industrial Court by trade
unionists from 20 in 1981 to over 2 000 in 1986.
4) Strikes are beginning to become a normal part of the
collective bargaining process, losing many of the sinister
implications attached to them in the past. This 1s possibly
best illustrated by the growth in the number of mediations
by the Independent Mediation Service of S.A., from 39 in
1984 to 131 in 1986. Most strikes continued to be over
wages. However, dismissals, retrenchment, recognition
and detention were a major cause of strike action.
Of particular interest is the growing sophistication in the
range of tactics used by workers from go-slows and over-time
bans, to factory occupations and sit-ins.
5) The post-Wiehahn period has seen the beginning of
serious collective bargaining in S.A. Many of the emerging
unions have now joined the Industrial Councils and have
begun to draw on the skills of professional economists in
their negotiations. In addition to wage bargaining, a
number of other issues that have previously been the
prerogative of management, such as health and safety, have
become Industrial relations issues.
6) In the post-Wiehahn period, the state has begun to
withdraw from two key areas of the labour market - from
all forms of statutory job reservation except the mines
and more ambiguiously, from the pass laws in June 1986.
The latter establishes freedom of movement as a nominal
right only - residence in urban areas still depends
on "approved accomodation.' The state now controls
movement through such Vacially neutral' legislation as
the Slums Act, Trespassers Act and Prevention of Illegal
Squatting Act. Rather than controlling the movement of
people into the urban areas through the pass laws, Cobbett
possibilities, they are also contradictory In a less apparent
sense. In fighting for, and advancing in this way, the new
unions are increasingly drawn into an industrial relations
web, that is not without cost. Collective bargaining, per
se, comes to dominate. The struggle becomes defined in
terms of the factory only; immediate economic and production
politics issues absorb all energy, and the wider political
questions begin to fade into a more distant realm that
seems beyond the capacity of a union to engage; political
engagement is reduced to purely rhetorical flourishes.
We would argue that there are objective social pressures
from the state and from capital, pulling the democratic unions
in this direction so that the impact of these gains is both
transformative and conservative. On the one hand militant
industrial unions have made real, albeit limited gains for their
members, while on the other they have channelled conflict in
ways that can be contained and institutionalized by the
industrial relations system. The state has made gains in
establishing a collective bargaining system that, as with all
such systems, can seal off reasonably effectively economic
from political struggles. This is not a startling conclusion.
Capitalist states have been relatively effective in containing
trade union pressures and actions within acceptable boundaries.
While the state has attained a degree of success in this
regard, it has also seriously undermined its own reform
programme. Historically, capitalist reforms have only
gained a reasonable degree of success when collective
bargaining concessions were backed by political rights, as
happened in 19th century Britain. The institutionalisation of
industrial conflict presupposes the early (and relatively
peaceful) attainment of formal social and political rights by
significant sectors of the working population.
Production as a consequence, Wood argues, ceases to be an
immediate political issue.(7) The roots of 'economism'lie in this
necessary shift of conflict to the point of production. The
struggle over appropriation appears not as a political struggle,
Wood argues, but as a battle over the terms and conditions of
work. In South Africa, the state's Intervention 1n production
makes its racial form clear for all to see, linking directly the
politics of production with global politics. Although Wiehahn
foresaw the necessity for political rights, the South African
state has been unable to move in a direction that is acceptable
to the black majority. The contradiction in the Wiehahn reforms
is now clear - it created the legal space for the rapid growth
of industrial unions while failing to provide the conditions for
their political incorporation. Instead o^ accepting the
universal franchise which has always served as a useful
integrating mechanism, the state has moved hesitantly towards
a racially based restructuring that still excludes Africans,
while maintaining white control. This has led to an
Intensification of the demand for national liberation. At the
same time, the recession has deepened, producing high levels of
youth unemployment. It is above all this social category - along
with students - that has led township resistance since 1976.
Trade unions have therefore been more sharply confronted
with a dual challenge since 1984: they have been forced to
confront the question of national liberation, and they have
been forced to relate to the youth-led civil war in the
townships. These pressures have forced union leaderships to
think through the relationship between trade union, factory-
based struggles, and broader political struggle. The
resolution of this central question has been twofold:
firstly, certain unions have thrown their resources into
broader-based resistance; secondly, a vigorous debate
has opened up within the unions, which still leaves a more
strategically thought out response to the question of the
trade union role and the precise form and content of national
liberation unresolved for the present.
PART 2 THE RE-EMERGENCE OF ALLIANCE POLITICS.
The economy has been in recession since 1982, resulting in
closures, retrenchments and mass unemployment. The falling
rand has fueled internal inflation and threatened the
balance of payments. For the state, the effect has been
to provoke a major fiscal crisis which in turn restricts
its ability to finance "reform1.(8).
The crisis has been met by unprecedented levels of
mobilisation and resistance in the factories and
communities over economic and political issues: the highest
strike levels in South African history; rent strikes; bus
boycotts; consumer boycotts; school boycotts; anti-constitiional
campaigns and stay-aways; all these forms of resistance became
permanent features of the political terrrain between
1984 and 1986. Moreover, this phase of resistance has been
marked by new organisational, ideological and political
alignments. This was most clearly evident in
November 1984 when unions, community as well as
student organisations joined together in the massive
Transvaal stay-away.
This is not to say that a struggle within the union movement
to define its political role began only after 1984. This
would ignore earlier attempts to engage politically and the
interesting debates that accompanied these struggles.
The debate over the relationship between trade
unions and politics was to re-emerge in 1979, when the Food
and Canning Workers Union called on the community to support
their union in a dispute with management in the Fattis and
Mom's plant in the Cape. Later that year the formation of
the Port Elizabeth Black Civic Organisation (PEBCO) was to
force community issues onto the shop floor when African
workers In the Ford Cortina plant went out on strike in
support of their community leader, Tozamile Botha. This was
to lead, In 1980, to the establisment of MACWUSA which,
along with the formation of SAAWU in East London a year
earlier, forced the unions to confront national politics.
The Food and Canning Workers Union argued in an article
written in 1982 that while there was a need to become
involved in community issues, a separate form of organisation
was required:
° We do believe that separate forms of organisation are
needed for these struggles. A trade union is not a
community or political organisation. A union which tries to
be a community or political organisation at the same time
cannot survive1.(9)
At the same time FOSATU entered the debate with a keynote
speech by their General Secretary, Joe Foster. Foster's
speech called for the building of a workers1 movement, much
more broadly defined than simple collective bargaining trade
unionism. It made provision for alliances and joint
campaigning with other progressive organisations and called
on union members to become involved in community and political
organisations. However, Foster went on to warn against
unions' being drawn into political action which was not worker
controlled but was "populist ' in character. Anti-populism
was to remain an important political perspective of many of
the FOSATU unions.
Foster's speech reaffirmed the principles of worker control
but now applied these to political action beyond production.
However, the guidelines set down were of a general nature,
allowing for very different interpretations: the criticism
of populism reinforced a narrow ° workerism1 in some
quarters; the provision for alliances and community
involvement was welcomed by those with national- democratic
leanings; whilst references to * workers control ' were
interpreted by the SACP as a form of syndicalism.
The debate came to focus on whether or not trade unions
should affiliate to the United Democratic Front, newly
formed in 1983. Unions such as MACWUSA and SAAWU articulated
a position which favoured affiliation on the grounds that
workers were also members of the community, and that unions
must also fight for their members' interests outside of
production. They also argued that trade unions encompassed
only a part of the working class, and further that a
successful political challenge to the state demanded
alliances with other social groups, and the widest possible
unity of those who are oppressed under apartheid. The GWU on
the other hand, asserted the need to ensure democratic
structures and worker control. The argument was that the
UDF was made up of activist-based organisations, with no
structures for mandating and acountabilty. The trade unions
would be swamped by a host of organisations, with equal
voting power, but often little real membership. Furthermore,
the UDF represented a multi-class alliance. Its very
style and language were at variance with the traditions
established in the unions, and did not contribute towards
working class leadership. These arguments became the rally-
ing cry of the anti-populist tendency.
While these issues were being debated, new forms of
organisation began to emerge on the ground. On the East
Rand, the shop stewards councils spearheaded agitation
against the destruction of shacks by the authorities.
In the Eastern Cape - and to a lesser extent in the Western
Cape and Natal - trade unions played a major role in the
anti-tricameral election campaign in 1984. In the same year
FOSATU locals led by certain FOSATU unions began to meet
with student and youth organisations to exchange views.
Simultaneously, community-based subsistence struggles led
by unionised workers - as in the case of the one-and-a-half .
year long East London bus boycott - pointed to the possiblity
of a more direct role for unions in politics.
However, these efforts remained localised and partial. In
the main, trade unions did not develop a unified national
approach to the question of political action . The movement
reained divided in its approach : the community unions ,
particularly SAAWU , engaged in direct confrontation with
the authorities ( the Ciskei "government'especially) . Some
Fosatu unions such as SFAWU and MAWU moved cautiously onto
this terrain on the local level. Others , such as the NUTW,
maintained an anti-populist stance , concentrating on
collective bargaining issues in the factory. Foster's speech
was not concretised , leaving a political vaccuum and
intensifying divisions inside the labour movement.
The development of shop steward councils during this period
illustrates the contradictions and political hesitancy at
this stage. Shop steward councils in East Rand townships
such as Katlehong, grouped shop stewards who lived in the
same area, but who worked in different factories and in
different industries. They took up township problems as
well as organizing solidarity for particular factory
struggles. There was a strong tinge of syndicalism in their
politics: unions could extend their structures Into the
community and embrace all issues. However, while FOSATU
generally took a positive attitude to this development ,
these councils failed to develop a structured
response to the township and wider political problems.(10).
Significantly when UMMAWSA split from MAWU in June 1984 ,
the break was justified in terms of MAWU's and FOSATU's
alleged lack of political involvement and leadership.
By August 1984, when the SADF invaded the townships , the
industrial unions were facing numerous pressures that
forced them to reconsider their organisational and political
strategies. On the one hand , there was increasing militancy
on the shop-floor as strike levels escalated , while on the
other hand , there was a need to consolidate their organisational
capacity in the face of a deepening recession. In addition,
the crisis in the townships and the general level of
nation-wide political mobilisation had forced the unions to
take an appropriate stand. Organised workers demanded a
direct Involvement in the struggle for political rights and
urban change. However, in the absence of one united
national trade union federation, there was no unified
strategy in response to these pressures. Consequently,
strategies were shaped at a local level. This can best be
illustrated through the first-hand accounts of activists
in a particular area - we will focus on the East Rand after
the invasion of the townships in August 1984 but similar
processes were at work in other townships in the Transvaal
such as Alexandra.
The SADF invasion of the townships had a dramatic impact on
the lives of workers, as the journey between township and
factory became extremely hazardous. A SFAWU shop steward
from Tembisa township spoke of the new set of questions this
posed for the unions:
"The streets of the township are (normally) more or less
flat with lots of people moving up and down all the
time. Then the soldiers came carrying guns and
raiding the houses. They would just come in
without permission. When they tried to put the
rents up from the 1st of August, pamphlets were
distributed calling for a rent boycott. At night
the SADF raided the houses of those not paying
rent and took whole families to the police
station. They would release one and tell him to
go and get the rent.
It was a terrible experience. We had no voice.
All the community organizations had been banned.
We had no platform to raise issues and we realized
that the trade union was our only platform. We
had to learn to use our power at the workplace on
these issues". (11)
In the ensuing months, workers du[ use their workplace
power. This took the form of stay aways. In this the
student organization, COSAS, was a catalyst. When student
demands were not met, COSAS took the initiative and called
for support from community and trade union organizations. A
positive relationship existed between youth and sections of
the organized workforce as a result of the Simba Chips
boycott that served to establish a working relationship
between youth and employed workers. As a shop steward
commented,
"This was an eye opener to many of the workers who
had not taken youth seriously. For instance, I
discussed with some of the youth in the townships
and I was surprised to hear them talking in terms
of class struggle and being clearer than many of
the workers themselves".(12)
Unions and community organizations responded to the COSAS
call. They set up parent-student committees in a number of
townships. In the Transvaal between August - November 1984,
a working relationship between community/student
organisations and trade unions began to emerge. This led to the
November 1984 stay-away. It was the beginning of united mass
action between organised labour, students and community
organisations, with unions sometimes taking a leading role.
For key sectors of the democratic union movement, it
marked a decisive break with absentionism. The sheer scale
of the stay-away must be understood in terms of the build-up
of conflict and struggle in three key areas - the townships,
the schools and the factories.
(See appendix 1 : black workers' stayaways 1984 - 1986.)
The significance of this joint action is that alliance
politics were being forged in the process of intensified
struggle , where workers confronted the township crisis daily,
rather than in refined political debate as to the
problems of populism. Organized workers, students,
unemployed youth, and other township activists gained
experience in working together as they faced issues daily;
township rents and the need for an organized response to
this crisis; police and army action, arrests, deaths of
'comrades' and the need to organize funerals and local
stay-aways in protest.
This was to begin a process of redefinition of the trade union
role and prioritized the question of national liberation.
These pressures were moving sections of the trade union movement
towards political unionism. It was however only the
beginnings of a process that would require systematic
debate and a more permanent structured response, rather than
ad hoc relationships in response to particular problems.
Also, other areas, particularly in Natal, that did not
experience township occupations as in the Transvaal, did not
move in the same way. The emergence of political unionism
was therefore partial, uneven and embryonic at this point in
time. It was still as if the union movement was being
pulled in opposite directions: a primary focus on the
factory and the need to bargain more effectively, win higher
wages, preempt dismissals, resist retrenchments; a focus on
township issues that could no longer be ignored. The
problem at this point was that the union leadership was
divided on how to respond to this. One union General
Secretary commented,
"The situation is getting out of hand. Township
issues are distracting us from our real work as
trade unionists".(13)
In contrast to this negative response that saw in every
township involvement another example of "nationalism
dragging the trade union movement along by its shirt tails",
others were far more positive in their assessment. For
them, the township demands had led to a creative
response on the part of organized labour, a response that
opened the way for the union movement to engage with
national liberation. The issue of the trade union role
remained in the melting pot - its direction undecided.
Much depended upon whether, and on what basis, a new
unity could be created
While November 1984 was an historically important moment
in which united mass action took place , during the coming
months a number of obstacles and problems emerged which
inhibited the realisation of this potential unity. Many of
these problems came to the fore when the non-UDF unions
opposed the PEBCO call for a Black Week-end consumer boycott
(March 16/17 1985) and a stay-away ( March 18 , 1985) as a
response to the political and economic crisis in the Eastern
Cape. PEBCO identified the following issues: mass
retrenchments , the AMCA-Ford merger and increased petrol
prices, with the last becoming the final focus of the stay-
away.
The non-UDF unions gave a number of reasons for opposing the
stay-away at that time. In particular , their public
statements were concerned that a call made by PEBCO - an
African community organisation - would exclude 'coloured '
workers; a local response to what was a national problem was
likely to be ineffective ; there was inadequate
consultation with the workers ; and workers 1n smaller and
unorganised establishemnts would be vulnerable.
In the event , the stay-away was successful among African
workers but had limited success among 'coloureds '(See
Appendix 1.).These differences reflect the reality of a
divided working class - divisions that find organisational
expression in the previous division between PEBCO and the
FOSATU trade unions . In addition , the recession -
particularly severe in the auto industry which has been
concentrated in the Eastern Cape - affected workers
in different ways. While unions such as NAAWU were concerned
to consolidate their position - seeking to preserve jobs and
the gains already made through collective bargaining -
unemployed workers , many of whom were members of the Port
Elizabeth Youth Congress - PEYCO - played an important role
in the mass protests in the townships.
This again illustrates that the emergence of social
movement unionism is not necessarily a smooth progression
from one form to another. During this phase, instances of a
tense and conflictual relationship between trade unions
committed to collective bargaining gains, and community
organizations striving to assert a wider political
engagement, were not uncommon. Transcending this divide
would be a central challenge that the newly formed
federation, COSATU, would have to face.
The launch of COSATU in December 1985 represented a broad
shift of key trade unions towards a more direct concern
with non-factory issues. COSATU identified publicly with
the national liberation struggle early in 1986 after a visit
by a COSATU delegation to Lusaka. The joint ANC-SACTU-COSATU
statement acknowledged the independent existence of COSATU,
while at the same time viewing trade unions as an essential
component of the national struggle.
"As a representative of our working class, COSATU
is seized with the task of engaging the workers 1n
the general democratic struggle, both as an
independent organization and as an essential
component of the democratic forces in our country".(14)
This statement of intent by the COSATU leadership,
based on the November 1985 Congress resolutions, was
an attempt to come to terms with the crisis in the
townships. Essentially, this meant thinking through the
relationship with the national liberation movement and
the relationship between students, unemployed youth and the
organized workforce.
The SFAWU National Executive Committee had, in an
earlier discussion paper influenced by the events on the
East Rand in 1984/ 85, attempted to come to grips with this
issue. The document argued that in the context of a deepening
economic and political crisis, the country had entered a
"phase of uninterrupted struggle. It is the youth who are at
the vanguard of that struggle. It is the youth that are
demanding through their struggles fundamental change and a
restructuring of society. In this flow of struggle the
organized power of workers is crucial".(15)
The document continued:
"Township struggles are being waged and determined by
youth...who also constitute a major part of the masses
of the unemployed".
There was therefore a need to work for a "convergence" of
workplace and township forms of struggle, rather than the
existing situation where such struggles were being waged in
parallel.
The document argued further that such alliances should only
be formed on a principled, or disciplined basis, that is,
the union movement should spell out the terms upon which it
is prepared to enter such an alliance. These terms should
include a recognition of the following:
the right of workers to control society, since
they produced the wealth; consequently other
groups in an alliance would have to recognize
that the interests of workers could not be
subordinated to the interests of other social
classes.
During 1986 the COSATU leadership began to spell out what
such control could mean in practice. It would emerge, they
believed, out of the organizing style that the unions had
developed.(16). This was based on the "absolute control" that
workers exercised over all "decision-making in the organization".
This could be achieved through constitutions that entrenched such a
principle; through shop steward elections in each department
of a shop, factory or mine; through such leaders' only acting
on the basis of mandates from the membership and regular
report backs; and by structures of the unions that would
incorporate a worker majority at all levels. This, COSATU
believed, would lay the basis for developing an "alliance between
students, youth and worker parents", that would point the way
foward to "people's power", that is, the power of an alliance
of classes, rather than the working class striving on its
own. This required the development of forms of organization
appropriate to the different terrains of struggle. These
included SRCs in the schools, civics in the townships,
unions in the factories and the organization of an
unemployed workers union, so that the various spheres of
struggle could be linked and not "fought on isolated and
individual fronts".
PART 3 CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE
How did this strategy unfold during 1986? COSATU has
encounterd a number of challenges in attempting to put Into
practice alliance politics: strong opposition to alliance
politics on the part of a section of COSATU; further
debate amongst the larger COSATU affiliates as to the
precise content of the general principles outlined by the
leadership; the failure to meet the unrealistic deadline of
one union one Industry within six months; an ongoing search
for appropriate forms of organization for the unemployed ;
and finally, meeting the challenge of the state of emergency
and debate forms of self defence that could be effective
under the new conditions.
Opposition to alliance politics was to emerge openly
in the months following the COSATU launch among a section
of the leadership that were critical of COSATU's new
political direction. They charged that this new political
direction was "misdirected", and that this "rush" to espouse
"alliance politics" might result in a situation where years of
painstaking work might be swept aside and the working class
again be without democratic trade unions. (17) The essence
of the argument is that populism and nationalism, which have
gained increasing support during the current crisis, stand in
absolute contradiction to a working class politics. The
organizational styles and political content of each are so
different, it is argued, that any involvement of the working
class in such politics can mean only one thing: the abandonment
of independence and with it the abandonment of working class
politics. Alliance politics which stresses "the people" and
not the working class is a non-class based politics that fails
to prepare the workers for socialism. Unions that become
embroiled in populist campaigns will lose their organizational
independence, because they will find themselves unable to
control such campaigns. Populist organizations, it is
argued, are anti-democratic in character because the actions
of the "leaders' are not accountable, as no recognizable
membership exists.
The anti-populists are also concerned with what they
see as the inability of the unions to control the
"confrontationist" strategy of the populists. The personal
attacks of some of COSATU leadership on Buthelezi is cited
as an example of the consequences of such a strategy as it
has caused problems for unionists in Natal. These
practices, it is argued, will "exhaust" the unions rather
than their opponents as unionists get "dragged into each and
every adventurous action that is initiated". Critics of
alliance politics have seen evidence of such "adventurous
action' in the poor response to COSATU's call for a 'day of
action1 on the 14th July 1986 to protest against the State
of Emergency.
Increasingly, the larger unions have been far more
interested in giving specific content to the rather general
and abstract principles outlined by the COSATU leadership in
its early phase than debating whether or not alliances are in
the interests of the working class. Such debate now
centres on the form such alliances should take, the
definition of socialism, and Its relationship to national
struggle. The Metal and Allied Workers Union , for example,
at its congress in July 1986 committed itself to building socialism
in South Africa in a struggle spearheaded by the working
class. The resolution argued that :
Worker leaders are increasingly playing a leading role In
the community. The lack of initiatives, and the confusion
that exists within the community itself on political issues
arises from the lack of a working class programme.
The union went on to set itself the task in the
coming period,* of beginning to define what we mean by
socialism1.(18)
Similarly , the leadership of NUM at their congress 1n March
1987 began to give content to their notion of alliance
politics by inviting Winnie Mandela, wife of the jailed ANC
leader and Honorary President of NUM, Nelson Mandela, and
Murphy Morobe, acting publicity Secretary of the UDF, to speak
at the opening of the congress. James Motlatsi, NUM President,
spelt out his understanding of the political direction
of the union:
Attempts by the governemnt to impose the tricameral
parliament system and community councils have failed
totally. Its reform plans have been met with large scale
opposition from every part of the country - urban and rural
Today the state 's plans lie in ruins Only a
democratic socialist order , which uses the country's
resources for the benefit of its people will solve the
crisis We must build firm , discplined and effective
alliances with the democratic organisations.(19)
It is significant that these debates are taking place
amongst the larger, industrially-based affiliates of COSATU,
for it is here that real power lies. This power
consolidated during 1986, when mergers took place in the
transport sector (the merger of TGWU with GWU to form the
new TGWU ) the food sector( the FCWU ,SFAWU and RAWU into
the FAWU), and the absorption of a plastic union in the
Western Cape into the CWIU. Although COSATU failed to meet
its ambitious deadline, the principle of mergers has now
taken hold. A major merger in the metal industry is expected
soon; a S.A. Railway and Harbour Workers Union, which will
merge into TGWU, has now been launched, as has the new
construction union, CAWU; plans are proceeding with a
nation-wide agricultural union.
Apart from consolidating power Industrially, the crucial
issue of the relationship of organized workers with the
unemployed remains. While difficult to avoid, it remains a
challenge that union movements in other societies with
substantial welfare state provisions, have not had to
confront in any concrete organizational sense. At present,
the potential for real tension exists between organized and
politicized, unemployed youth, and unionized workers.
Political oppression has compounded the generational tensions
in township households. The attitude of the youth 1s complex
and contradictory: they recognize that their parents are victims
of racial oppression and economic exploitation, and therefore
empathize with them; but they blame their parents for not
fighting against this with sufficient vigour, and therefore
feel anger and frustration at what they perceive to be their
parents failings.
"Our parents still have that old Image they grew
up under. They tell us that the white man, Is a
white man, and what he says is final. When we try
to argue with our parents they will just say,
"what do you know, you were only born yesterday.
You have got to listen to what we are telling
you?1 We are caught in a trap. What our parents
don't seem to have is a desire for us to be better
peoples....If you bring your parents In and sit
them there, and discuss with them, they just fold
their arms and say nothing. So now we do
everything for ourselves without consulting our
parents because it 1s useless to speak to a stone".(20)
A potentially antagonistic attitude towards the unions
exists among some of the youth:
"Many unions just ask for wage demands and the
reduction of working hours. I know factories
where workers just ask for boots and
overalls...but don't find there's an Importance in
the struggle. But we are the highly politized ones.
....We embrace one cause, we understand what
the cause is, and we sacrifice, even our lives,
because we understand what 1s actually happening.
But workers, ha! If you only receive those boots
and those boots are being torn up again, then you
will start boycotting the factory and demanding
new boots, because this one is a bit old!
That is why when we call for actions like stay
aways they often don't understand the importance
of the stayaway....They are often narrow, and just
look at the disadvantages of stayaways. They just
say, "If we don't work for a week, we won't get
money for that week'. So what they normally do Is
to take another route and walk through fences and.
jump those bridges to go to work...If individuals
were highly organized and politicized their
response would be positive enough. They would be
able to sacrifice even for the whole month by
staying away from the factories. Liberation would
be bought easily. It just depends on how the
unions will operate".
The establishment of an organized relationship with the
unemployed will doubtlessly ease these tensions as the
youth come to understand trade unionism at a deeper level.
Much will depend on the way that the trade union movement
unfolds in the coming years. An alliance has the potential
to ease these tensions. Orthodox unionism will reinforce
them. From their vantage point of the streets, youth have
no stake in any gradual struggle. The longer the struggle,
the longer their misery. Tomorrow, they say, the struggle
must be won. It is, some have suggested, a form of '
"immediatism1. These are the pressures of the township
that many trade union leaders have had to contend with.
After the army occupied the townships, protest became
increasingly militaristic as large numbers of youth began
engaging the security forces in running street battles that
claimed hundreds of lives. The militaristic voluntarism of
this section of the youth has sometimes eclipsed the
organisational concerns of union activists as the townships
have become ungovernable. In these cases trade unionists and
community activists have found themselves sandwiched between
the militarism of the youth and the terror tactics of the
security forces. Whereas sections of the youth were criticising
them for being too moderate, the security forces were hunting
them down and detaining or killing them.
However, COSAS youth who have had organizational experience,
do recognize the organizational concerns of unions. They
recognize the tensions between organization and mobilization,
as they themselves are confronted with problems arising from
what they regard as the undisciplined actions of unorganized,
often anti-social elements in the townships. Once an
organized relationship is established, the concerns and the
perspectives of trade union leadership could be articulated
in a constructive manner. Tensions and potential conflicts
could be transformed into interlacing and unified struggle.
That is why they believe an alliance is necessary.
COSATU has resolved to establish an unemployed workers
union, and the leadership is presently exploring the form
that this should take. Unemployed youth are themselves
involved in this initiative, which will have a significant
bearing on the type of labour movement to emerge in South
Africa.
These challenges are being met in the context of the state
of emergency and the onslaught of Inkatha in Natal, and
right wing vigilante terror in other provinces. The second
state of emergency affected COSATU leadership particularly
badly . The Labour Monitoring Group's December report
showed that 614 union leaders, about 80 % of them with
COSATU links , had been arrested in terms of the emergency
regulations.(21) More than half were still in detention.
Over 2000 rank-and-file union members suffered the same
fate in mass detentions during disputes in the second half
of last year. More disturbing was the murder of two MAWU
shop stewards as well as some their relatives at Mpophomeni
near Howick on December 5 and 6 1986 by vigilantes reported to be
carrying Inkatha flags. The launch of the Inkatha-backed UWUSA
in May 1986 in direct organisational and ideological opposition
to COSATU has further sharpened divisions 1n factories In
certain parts of Natal .
The most effective response to this onslaught is still being
debated. Some are reflecting on whether it would not be
wiser to return to collective bargaining unionism.
"Workers want real gains. They want to be able to
see concrete improvements, in wages, in working
conditions and in transport. Before the emergency
many were caught up in the idea of liberation. It
seemed as though we were on the move at last. Now
all of that has changed. We must return to
tangible gains. Workers can't be kept going on
ideas". (j?23).
Retreat could be one important effect of the Emergency. In
some senses such an option would be prudent - real gains, we
argued in Part 1 of this paper, have been made by unions in
the post-Wiehahn period. Furthermore powerful forces both
locally and internationally are encouraging such a
direction. One example internationally is the AALC in
Washington. In a report, written in May 1986, recommending
the criteria that should be used in selecting which unions
to give financial support to, the author makes clear
that the AFL-CIO should only support "business trade
unionism and not ideological trade unionism...(and that they
should be ) * careful to avoid any affiliation with the active
partisans in the political trade union arena'.(23).
In sharp contrast to this attempt to assert the apolitcal
tradition of American "business unionism1 is the more
creative response of some far-sighted managers who
have realised the disruptive effect of political conflict 6"n
the delicate industrial relations structures and have tried
to mediate in these conflicts in order to absorb them into
the collective bargaining structures. This approach takes as
its point of departure the inevitabilty of the "politicfzation1
of industrial relations because of the lack of political
rights in South Africa. Traditional industrial relations
theory, it is argued, needs to be adapted to the peculiar
conditions of South Africa where mananagment and employees
have sufficient common interest to enter into agreements on
certain political issues.(24)
Some companies have already begun to put this approach into
practice. The 1986 Anglo American Annual Report notes that:
'Several companies have taken the Initiative 1n
mediating directly between the police and local
authorities on the one hand, and company
employees, on the other hand, 1n endeavouring to
resolve conflicts which have spilled over into the
workplace. '(25).
The benefits of this kind of institutionalisation are clear,
writes a background Anglo American document :
°by accepting an involvement in problem-solving
outside the factory gate, management gains new
controls over the conduct of its employees and
simultaneously opens up avenues of common interest
in which management and its employees can pursue
common goals.' (26).
Other managers have embarked on the more conventional path
of attempting to pressurise the government into a clearer
°reform' direction. Increasingly alarmed at the spread of
radical, even socialist ideas among workers, the business
community has stepped up its pressure on the government to
remove some key features of apartheid such as the Group
Areas Act. The meeting of prominent businessmen with the
African National Congress In late 1985 Is both an index of
the degree of impatience with the "pace of reform', as well
as the seriousness with which the business community is now
exploring and campaigning for their version of a post-
apartheid society. The most ambitious attempt to date is
the Federated Chamber of Industries Business Charter.
Conceived of as an alternative to the Freedom Charter,
the Business Charter spells out the principles of a free
enterprise economy and society. Importantly, this includes
a firm commitment to less Involvement of the state in welfare,
growing privatisation and deregulation. For some, such as
Douwes-Dekker of the Wits Business School, the conditions now
exist for an open alliance between management and labour In the
form of bilateral agreements involving organised labour and
organised capital. This, he believes, will provide the base
for moving towards a more effective industrial relations
system and ultimately a form of corporatism or social
democracy.(27).
Not surprisingly, deep scepticism exists among black workers
to any notion of an employer-employee alliance against the
apartheid state. The recession has led to a decline in
wages in real terms and retrenchment has swelled the ranks
of the unemployed putting the trade union movement onto the
defensive. Employers have intensified work through work
study. This intensification of struggle on the shop floor
makes an alliance between unions and employers unlikely.
A more significant reason why such an alliance is unlikely
is that employers are seen by black workers as the chief
beneficiaries of the apartheid system as well as its driving
force. They are sceptical of employers1 attempts to
distance themselves from apartheid. They point to the fact
that this is not the first time that employers have called
for the end of apartheid - 1n the immediate post-Sharpeville
period and after Soweto 1n 1976, employers called for the
removal of certain racial laws, only to adapt to the dominant
norms once the unrest had subsided. They do not believe that
employers have the will or the capacity to remove the apartheid
state.(28).
It is significant that NUM has chosen, not to retreat from
alliance politics, but rather to begin to spell
out what they mean by an alliance. "Our organisation has
taken a political stance because in the five years of its
existence it found politics were responsible for our
problems1, NUM president, James Motlatsi, said at their 1987
congress.(29). This is not only important because of NUM's
size but also because the mining industry rests on the
political foundations of the apartheid system .
CONCLUSION.
We have attempted to trace some of the social forces that
have come to play a part in shaping the trade union role.
In our view, the alliance is still embryonic. Powerful
forces are determined to break any attempt to link
production politics and state politics in the union's
strategic programme. The entire security apparatus is in a
state of mobilization to try and contain the vigorous
movement of resistance that has emerged in the post 1984
period. Managements strive to integrate demands into the
industrial relations system. What all these forces have on
their side is an objective set of conditions that make
orthodox unionism appear to be a more prudent option for
union leadership.
But the lack of political rights and the economic recession
make such an option diffficult to follow in practice unless
certain key demands can be met within the forseeable future.
Many of these demands can only be met by a Lancaster House-
type negotiated settlement. This Is a conclusion that at
least some of the businessmen who travelled to Lusaka in
1985 must have come to.
Under the specific conditions of South Africa, a new form of
unionism has begun to emerge. Under these conditions
the trade unions, in alliance with students, the youth, the
unemployed and community groups, have begun to play a
leading role in the struggle for democracy and political
rights in society at large. This new form of unionism has
the potential to forge an alliance with the popular movement
on the basis of equality, and a commitment to defend a
working class, socialist programme in a liberated South
Africa.
Structural transformations in the South African economy
have created this potential.(30). In summary these are:
(1) The establishment of effective structures of collective
bargaining through the growth and consolidation of nation-
wide mass based industrial trade unions in most sectors
of the economy.
(2). Accompanying this has been the growth of fully
proletarianised working class communities, including large
numbers of militant students and unemployed youth without
adequate social infrastructure.
(3).The intervention of the state - particlarly since 1984
and intensified since the State of Emergency - into a range
of areas of social life, combined with the lack of political
incorporation of the black population, has ensured that
localised grievances are soon translated into confrontation
with the state. This also, of course, ensures the persistence
of the national tradition.
As in Poland with the Solidarity union movement, these
unions are now taking up the concerns of working people as
a whole, and posing new horisons for trade union work. In
this they are responding to the needs of working people as
a whole. Unlike Solidarity, the South African
union movement has a greater chance of success because of
the relative strength and durabilty of the shop floor
structures that have been established in the workplaces.
When faced, for example, by a direct state attack on its
leadership, as happened during the State of Emergency, some
of these unions were able to win significant concessions,
such as time off for shop-stewards to run the union offices
when certain leaders were detained. This Innovative use of
collective bargaining structures in the face of political
repression has the potential to succeed in the long term,
if it 1s able to retain the gains made on the shop-floor
in the post-Wiehahn period, and j_f present debates and
initiatives towards other social groups shift into the realm
of structured relationships.
This is the promise of the new union movement in South Africa
and the challenge it poses to managers trained in traditional
industrial relations theory and practice, as well as to those
in the national movement who see trade unions simply as the
transmission belt in a future centrally planned
economy.(31).
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